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ABSTRACT
Previous research suggests that the processing of affordances may require more
perceptually relevant information than words can provide (Surber et al., 2018; Chainay &
Humphreys, 2002). The present study investigates this hypothesis with the shoebox task
used in Bowers and Turner (2003). A list of 81 object nouns (targets) and associated
features (primes: affordance, semantic, and non-associates) was compiled from the
McRae, Cree, Seidenberg, and McNorgan (2005) norms. Affordances denote possibilities
for action in relation to the object (e.g. chair – sit), whereas semantic features indicate
definitional characteristics (e.g. chair – has legs). Affordances and semantic features
served as primes in the present experiments. Primes were presented as words in all
experiments. Participants decided if primes and targets could fit inside of a shoebox
across three experiments. Experiment 1 presented target objects as words (i.e. the name
of the object) or photographs (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010).
Experiment 2 presented target objects as photographs degraded by 1 of 3 levels (clear,
medium blur, maximum blur). Experiment 3 presented target objects as photographs that
began degraded and slowly became clear. Results for Experiments 1 and 2 showed a
significant priming effect for affordances (i.e. affordance primed objects were responded
to faster than objects primed with non-associate, as well as a significant effect of
accuracy for affordance primed objects. Experiment 3 results showed a marginally
significant effect of prime type on reaction time. These results are consistent with the
idea that affordance perception is optimized for real-world stimuli.
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CHAPTER I - Introduction
Interacting with an object in the environment is achieved by perceiving
possibilities for action (i.e., affordances, Gibson, 2014). Our actions are mediated by an
actor’s capabilities and the environmental constraints imposed on the actor. Gibson
argued that this process involves the pickup of meaningful information from the
environment. Through repeated interactions with various objects and environments, an
actor will begin to store a record of these interactions. This process helps the actor learn
and form memories about their environment. Semantic memory, the storehouse of
knowledge for what a person knows about the world (Balota & Coane, 2008), plays a
crucial role in this process. This knowledge is gathered throughout one’s life, and
includes facts about the world, the meaning of words, one’s ideas, and the concept of
objects. Given affordances are essential for everyday functioning and behavior,
affordance features should be distinct from, and perhaps even more salient than, semantic
features of objects.
Supporting the claim that affordance features are processed differently from
semantic features, recent research has shown that there may be a separate memory
process for action features (Silveri & Ciccarelli, 2009). Research on patients with brain
impairments has shown that patients can use an object without having semantic
knowledge of the object (Hodges, Bozeat, Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000; Silveri &
Ciccarelli, 2009). Silveri and Ciccarelli (2009) investigated whether patients with mild to
severe semantic memory impairment were able to recognize and/or use objects. The
authors concluded that when semantic memory deficits are mild, non-declarative forms of
memory such as procedural-motor memory can support and compensate the patient’s
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ability to act. However, it is important to note that semantic memory and proceduralmotor memory interact. This can be seen in patients with severe neurological deficits, as
they are unable to complete tasks that involve functional use of objects.
1.1 Theories of Semantic Processing
In order to investigate the potential differences between affordance features and
semantic features, I need to first review the literature on theories of semantic processing.
The network approach was developed by Quillian (1968), and further improved upon by
Collins and Loftus (1975). The main feature of this approach is that semantic knowledge
is embedded within a network structure and is linked by association. This model posits
that related concepts are organized closer together in the network than unrelated
concepts. The alternative approach called the Feature Analytic Theory developed by
Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974) focuses on defining and characteristic features. Defining
features are the necessary features of exemplars or prototypes of a category, whereas
characteristic features are shared features of most exemplars. It is still unclear what is the
nature of these representations, and how they are formed. Regardless, there might be
some evidence for using the sensorimotor system as a grounding for semantic memory
representations.
Barsalou (1999) posited a link between sensorimotor systems and semantic
memory with his theory of Perceptual Symbol Systems. According to Barsalou (1999)
information is picked up from the environment via several different modalities and
processing systems: The sensory system (i.e., sight, haptic), the motor system (i.e.,
actions), kinesthetic system (i.e., object manipulation), proprioceptive systems (i.e.,
internal feedback system), emotional systems (i.e., happy, fear), the cognitive systems
2

(i.e., language processing), and the perceptual system (i.e., affordance processing). The
information gathered from modalities is processed in their respective memory system
(i.e., visual memory). The information is then integrated together in association areas.
Retrieving from semantic memory involves a simulator, in which neural activation at
encoding becomes reinstated.
Siakaluk, Pexman, Aguilera, Owen, and Sears (2008a) used perceptual symbol
systems as the theoretical model for a word recognition task. In their experiment, bodyobject interaction (BOI), the ease with which someone could physically interact with the
referent of the word, was used as the measure of sensorimotor knowledge. Participants
engaged in a Lexical Decision Task (LDT) comparing high BOI words with low BOI
words. They found a facilitatory effect of BOI with high BOI words being recognized
faster than low BOI words. The authors explained this using the feedback activation
framework of visual word recognition (Hino & Lupker, 1996). The high BOI words had
richer semantic representations which provided stronger feedback activation to
orthography and phonology, facilitating reaction times. It is therefore possible that
affordances may have high BOI value due to rich action-related content and which in turn
would be processed faster than low BOI words.
Siakaluk et al. (2008b) followed up their experiment by looking at BOI and direct
semantic processing. Experiment 1A and 1B consisted of a semantic categorization task
(SCT) in which participants decided whether words were easily imageable (1A) or not
easily imageable (1B). Imageability was defined as the ease with which a word can
produce a mental image. Across experiments reaction times and accuracy were greater
for high BOI versus low BOI words. Experiment 2 involved a semantic lexical decision
3

task (SLDT) where participants first made a lexical decision followed by an imageability
response. Again, BOI effects were detected and these were even larger than Experiment
1, further supporting the notion that high BOI can promote semantic processing.
In a subsequent study, Wellsby, Siakaluk, Owen, and Pexman (2011) evaluated
the possibility that BOI facilitation was due to the motor system speeding key presses
versus semantic activation. To test this priming hypothesis, the authors used three go/nogo semantic categorization tasks: A button press condition, a pronunciation condition,
and a verbal condition, and participants were asked to respond to words that were
imageable. Across tasks, the BOI facilitation effect was found, providing evidence for
embodied cognition and against the motor priming hypothesis.
1.2 Affordances and Semantic Processing
Gibson (1979) theorized that all the sense organs can pick up the same
information from the environment using different forms of stimulus energy. This suggests
that if a sensory organ is relevant for a given behavior, it will perceive some form of
environmental information to aid in the actualization of the affordance. By picking up
this information an actor can perform successful actions within their environment. Each
animal forms a unique relationship with the environment due to different intrinsic metrics
(i.e., eye height, strength, motor functioning, etc.) relevant to only that specific animal
and task. In this way, a unique link is established between actor and environment.
Perceptual systems are suited to perceive relational properties (animal-environment
relationship) that fulfill meaningful actions. This animal-environment relationship
implies that the animal must be aware of its own capabilities, as well as the environment
and its features to accurately perceive what it can do in a given situation. At the center of
4

the relationship between the environment and the actor are the sensory and perceptual
systems. This leads to one important implication, that perception and cognition function
to process affordances and guide actions (Wilson 2002).
There are several affordance tasks that have been used by researchers. Wagman,
Thomas, McBride and Day (2013) had participants make maximum reaching height
judgements with or without the aid of objects (a stick and a stepstool). Participants made
these decisions when objects were both present and absent from their view. For absent
objects participants had to rely on their memory of the object while making their
decisions. They found that participants were able to make accurate judgements of their
reaching ability regardless of whether the object was present or absent. The authors
concluded that this is due to the nature of affordance perception and memory according to
the ecological perspective. Specifically, that perception and memory are not wholly
distinct. These processes have a nested structure that act together to guide behaviors, and
the two processes are best thought of as lying on two ends of the same continuous
spectrum belonging to the same cognitive process.
Thomas and Riley (2014) expanded upon these results in two experiments.
Experiment 1 replicated the results from Wagman et al. (2013), showing that participants
were able to make accurate reaching judgements regardless of whether the stick was
present or absent. Experiment 2 asked participants to make aperture pass-through-ability
judgements (i.e., the minimum distance between two surfaces that afford passing
through) while holding a stick. The stick was held in their right hand perpendicular to
their body, making it harder to pass through smaller apertures. Participants were also
asked to estimate the length of the stick used for reaching. The results again show that
5

participants can make accurate affordance judgements regardless of whether participants
were able to view the aid object (stick) or whether they had to remember its affordances.
Further analysis compared affordance judgements with a lower-order metric judgement
computed by combining perceived stick length with perceived abilities without aid. They
found that participants’ judgements were more accurate when participants were making
action relevant decisions compared to action neutral decisions (i.e., stick length). The
authors concluded that I perceive and interpret our environment based on action relevant
criteria instead of lower-order properties such as metric length. This is evidence that
affordance may be the most meaningful feature of an object compared to other semantic
features.
Thomas and Riley (2015) manipulated action neutral properties of objects and had
participants make decisions of maximum reachability. Specifically, they manipulated the
mass and rotational inertia of two different rods, of the same length, used to aid in
reachability. Participants made reachability judgements with both rods. Once participants
had made their reaching judgements (with and without aid), participants were asked to
report the heaviness of the two rods. This was done to determine if participants would
remember action-neutral properties not relevant to the given task. Participants reported no
differences in the affordance judgements between rods, which is not surprising given that
both rods were the same length. This was true even when rods were absent from view and
participants were required to remember affordance properties of the rod. The rod length
judgements showed no difference in their reported weights. This is further evidence that
perception and possibly memory, focuses on the action-relevant properties of objects that
aid actions.
6

Another important cognitive process alongside memory is categorization. It is an
open question whether categorization is based on affordance properties of objects, tools
and tasks. There is empirical evidence showing that I categorize the surrounding
environment through affordances available within the space. For instance, Greene,
Baldassano, Esteva, Beck, and Fei-Fei (2014) presented participants with a scene (i.e.,
kitchen), and then asked which of 3 comparison scenes had the most in common with the
target room. For example, if participants are shown a picture of a modern-day kitchen
scene and asked which of three scenes (kitchen supply store, modern day laundry,
medieval kitchen) is most similar to the presented pictures. The authors found that
affordance-based similarities predicted which selection was most likely to be chosen by
participants. What this means is that if any of the three scenes shared any functions with
the presented scene, it was most likely to be selected over the others. This was compared
to more traditional explanations of visual scene categorization such as visual features and
objects. The authors concluded that this provides evidence for scene categorization based
on affordances, which is another example of the perceptual systems interacting with
semantic memory.
Pilot research conducted by Surber, Huff, Brown, Doyon, Clark, and Hajnal
(2018) found affordance primes to be slower than semantic features and non-associates in
a reaction time task that used words as stimuli presented on a computer screen when
asked to judge whether the meaning of the word is abstract or concrete. One possibility
for the inferior performance of affordance primes might be the fact that affordances are
typically encountered through our senses, and not linguistically. Consistent with this
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notion, Snow, Skiba, Coleman, and Berryhill (2014) found that participants were able to
remember more real-world objects compared to pictures of the same objects.
Similarly, Chainay and Humphreys (2002) found that action knowledge is more
relevant for pictures of objects compared with the name of the object. Participants were
presented with objects as either pictures (line drawings) or words (name of object), and
asked to perform one of two tasks (semantic categorization or action decision).
Participants in the semantic categorization task were asked to decide if the object could
commonly be found in a kitchen, while the instructions for the action decision task were
to decide if the object was twistable or pourable. The authors found that participants were
faster and more accurate for objects presented as pictures when the task was action
oriented, while objects presented as words facilitated responding to the semantic task.
To sum up, sensory information (pictures over words) is more relevant to action
than to higher level cognition, and direct sensory information (seeing a real object) is
processed faster than indirect sensory information (looking at photographs of objects).
1.3 Overview of the Current Study
For the present experiment, I hypothesized that visual information may be needed to
facilitate the priming effects of affordances. Specifically, pictorial depictions of objects
might be better suited for facilitating affordance-based priming than linguistic
information such as reading a word on a computer screen. To test these hypotheses, I
investigated the effects of priming (affordances, feature, or non-associate) on a semantic
categorization task. In Experiment 1, a set of 81 object (target) and prime pairs were used
as stimuli. Photographs of the objects were obtained from the Bank of Standardized
Stimuli (Brodeur, Dionne-Dostie, Montreuil, & Lepage, 2010). Participants were
8

assigned to either word or picture target conditions. Participants were presented with
word primes followed by a target stimulus (word or picture). They were asked to decide
if the stimuli (primes and targets) could fit inside of a shoebox (Bowers and Turner,
2003). The shoebox task gives two advantages versus the abstract/concrete task used in
Surber et al. (2018). First, because pictures are inherently concrete, this could provide an
advantage for affordance processing over words in the abstract/concrete categorization
task. Secondly, the shoebox task is more ecologically valid for testing affordances than
abstract/concrete decisions because the shoebox task asks participants to make an action
decision. In Experiment 2, the same 81 images from Experiment 1 were used.
Participants were presented with a prime and then a visual image (target). Participants
were again asked to decide if the presented stimuli could fit inside a shoebox. To
determine how much visual information is needed to facilitate responding to various
types of primes, pictures were manipulated so that some images appeared clear, slightly
blurry, or very blurry. To further investigate how much information is needed to
recognize an object was examined in Experiment 3. I wanted to discover what is the
minimum amount of visual information that is necessary to recognize an object, and
whether less information is needed to process affordances than semantic content.
Participants were first presented with a prime word (affordance, semantic feature, or nonassociate). They were then presented with an artificially darkened screen so that features
of the object were not visible initially, but then gradually became clearer. Participants
were asked to identify the object as quickly as possible as the picture was becoming
clearer. In sum, I argued that 1) affordances are optimally processed via perceptual
information, not linguistically, 2) the quality of the perceptual information influences
9

processing of affordances, and 3) visual object recognition is faster and more efficient
when primed with affordance features compared to semantic features.
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CHAPTER II – Experiment 1
2.1 Participants
58 participants (36 females; Mage=20.44 years) from the University of Southern
Mississippi participated for partial course credit. Participants were required to have
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and have no motor problems. A total of 62
participants were gathered for this experiment, but 4 participants had to be excluded due
to English not being their first language.
2.2 Materials
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 30-inch color screen connected to a Windows
10 laptop. Responses (button presses) were made on a CMSTORM quick fire rapid
mechanical gaming keyboard. Answers were given by pressing the ‘F’ key for ‘Yes’ and
the ‘J’ key for ‘No’. The stimuli were presented and button presses (response time) were
controlled by E-Prime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). A black
cardboard shoebox was always visible to participants. The shoebox dimensions were
length 30cm × width 23cm × height 13cm.
2.3 Design
Experiment 1 was a 2×3 factorial mixed design. The between-subjects
independent variable was Stimulus type (pictures vs. words). Prime type (i.e., each
participant saw targets primed with affordances, features, and non-associates) was a
within-subject variable. The dependent variables for Experiment 1 were reaction time
(defined as the time between the start of stimulus presentation to a button-press response)
and accuracy (correct categorization with respect to fitting into a shoebox over the total
number of responses per cell). To analyze the results a 2 (Stimulus type: pictures vs.
11

words) × 3 (Prime type: affordance, features, non-associates) mixed ANOVA was
conducted.
2.4 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to view the target object as either a word or
picture (see Figure 1). Participants in the word categorization task viewed the primes
(affordance, semantic, non-associated) and targets (objects) as words. The picture
categorization task had participants view primes as words and targets as pictures of
objects. Participants sat in front of a computer monitor, while stimuli were presented. The
shoebox sat beside the computer monitor, and for the duration of the experiment,
participants could look at the shoebox at any point during a trial. Participants head
movements were not restricted, with the exception that participants were required to
remain a fixed distance from the screen at approximately 50 cm. Participants were
acclimated to the task by completing 6 practice trials. Practice trials were identical to
experimental trials.
Each trial began with a fixation point (a ‘+’ sign in the middle of the screen) for
1000 ms, followed by an inter-stimulus interval for 250 ms (Figure 1). Participants were
then shown a prime associated with a target object. Participants were asked to decide if
the presented prime could fit inside of a shoebox. If a prime was unable to be put inside
of a box (i.e. sit), participants were instructed to respond no. Primes were shown until
participants responded. A visual mask was then shown to participants for 1000 ms
followed by an inter-stimulus interval for 250 ms. Target objects were then presented as
either a word or picture depending on the assigned condition. Participants were asked to
respond by deciding if the presented object could fit inside of a shoebox. Participants
12

were able to view objects until they made their decision. Responses to primes and targets
were made continuously so that participants were not alerted to the relationship between
primes and targets, and therefore had no knowledge of whether a stimulus was a prime or
a target. Participants were asked to complete a short demographic and debriefing
questionnaire with questions related to participant expectations and opinions of the
experiment. Questionnaire answers were used to improve the design of the Experiment or
to address possible demand characteristic issues.
2.5 Data Analysis
All reaction times and accuracy data for Experiment 1 are based on an N=48 due
to data loss related to problems with the E-Prime software. As a result, responses for 10
participants were not recorded.
2.6 Results
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy by
Stimulus and Prime type. The average reaction time was computed based on trials that
resulted in correct responses. A main effect of Prime type was found on reaction times
F(2,92)=3.194, p<.05, ŋp2= .07 (see Figure 2). Objects primed with affordances were
responded to significantly faster than objects primed with non-associates (F(1,46)=5.27,
p=.03). No other comparisons were statistically significant. A main effect of Stimulus
type was significant on accuracy F(1,46)=9.465, p<.01, ŋp2= .17 (see Figure 3), in which
participants were more accurate for classifying pictures than words (p<.01). The Stimulus
type by Prime type interaction was not significant for any of the dependent measures.
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2.7 Discussion
Objects primed with affordances showed a priming effect for reaction times,
compared to non-associated primes. Object primed with semantic primes did not show a
priming effect compared to non-associated primes. Affordance primes provided an
advantage for objects presented as pictures. This provides evidence that affordance
perception is optimally processed through sensory experiences (i.e., the information
available in photographs taken of real objects). This is also evident in the accuracy of
responses for objects primed with affordances. This was not the case for objects
presented as pictures, which showed equal accuracy for all prime types. One caveat for
the accuracy of words (either prime or target) is that there is no guarantee that
participants thought of the same sized object (i.e., the word ‘ball’ in the current
experiment could be a tennis ball or a soccer ball). One possible reason for the failure to
find an accuracy effect may be due to data loss, and consequently, due to low statistical
power.
Experiment 1 demonstrated a clear benefit to affordance primes when the
information was presented pictorially. What is the nature of the visual information and
what are the limits on the amount of information necessary to sustain such performance?
The goal of Experiment 2 was to manipulate the amount of visual information available
to participants to try to answer this question. I reasoned that when presented visual
information was degraded, affordance primes would produce superior (faster and more
accurate) responses. The perception of affordances is an automatic process that should
allow for participants to recognize objects quicker even when the object is presented as a
low-quality image (i.e., blurred, with higher spatial frequencies removed).
14

CHAPTER III – Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, I sought to manipulate the amount and quality of visual
information present in pictures. I predicted that affordance primes would produce faster
responding to target objects compared to semantic and non-associate primes, even when
visual information was of poor quality.
3.1 Participants
68 (57 females; Mage=19.4 years) from the University of Southern Mississippi
participated for partial course credit. Participants were required to have normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and have no motor problems. A total of 75 participants were
gathered for this experiment, but 2 participants had to be excluded due to E-Prime 3.0
crashing during data collection. Another 5 participants were removed from analysis due
to distractions.
3.2 Materials
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 30-inch color computer screen connected to a
Windows 10 laptop. Responses (button presses) were performed on a gaming keyboard.
The stimuli were presented and button presses (response time) were controlled by EPrime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). A shoebox was visible to
participants throughout the experiment. Pictures were artificially blurred using the
gaussian blur feature in Photoshop. This feature applied the Gaussian function (𝐺(𝑥) =
1
√2𝜋𝜎2

𝑒

−

𝑥2
2𝜎2

) by a user specified amount (x) to every pixel of an image. The software

allows the user to set up a radius (measured in pixels) to determine how far should the
filter search for dissimilar pixels to blur. Pictures degraded with the extreme blur were
transformed with a gaussian blur of 15 pixels (radius of blur area). The pictures in the
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medium blur condition were transformed with a gaussian blur of 7.5 pixels. For examples
of stimuli see Figure 4.
3.3 Design
Experiment 2 was a mixed factorial design. Participants were presented with 81
unique objects. Participants never saw the same object twice. The independent variables
for Experiment 2 were Prime type (affordance, semantic, non-associate) and Image
Quality (clear, medium blur, extreme blur). The dependent variables were reaction time
(i.e., time from stimulus presentation to response button press) and accuracy
(correct/total). To analyze the data a 3 (Image Quality) × 3 (Prime type) mixed effects
ANOVA was computed on reaction time and accuracy.
3.4 Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to view target objects that are either very
blurry, somewhat blurry, or clear (see Figure 5). The primes were always presented as
words, just like in Experiment 1. All other procedures were identical to those in
Experiment 1.
3.5 Results
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for reaction times and accuracy. The average
reaction time was computed based on trials that resulted in correct responses. Results
showed a main effect of Prime type on reaction time F(2,130)=3.10, p<.05, ŋp2= .05 (see
Figure 6). Post hoc analyses identified that objects primed with affordances were
responded to faster than objects primed with non-associates (F(1,65)=4.53, p=.04). There
was a significant main effect of Prime type on accuracy, F(2,130)=4.54, p=.012, ŋp2= .07
(see Figure 7). Objects primed with affordances were categorized more accurately than
16

objects primed with non-associates (F(2,130)=10.63, p<.01). There was also a significant
effect of Image Quality on accuracy F(2,65)=4.63, p=.01, ŋp2= .12. Participants were
more accurate when the image quality was clear compared to the maximum blur (p<.01).
3.6 Discussion
Results for Experiment 2 showed a significant priming effect for affordances.
Objects primed with affordances were responded to faster than objects primed with nonassociates collapsed across image quality, replicating the reaction time results from
Experiment 1. The accuracy results from Experiment 2 show that objects primed with
affordances were responded to more accurately than objects primed with non-associates.
The image quality manipulation did not significantly change the way primes and
targets were responded to in terms of response time. A possible reason for the
manipulation failure may have been due to the stimuli itself. Specifically, blurred images
were presented as discrete static images. The perception of affordances is based on
information patterns that embody changes in stimulus arrays (Gibson, 2014). Information
emerges through changes in the optic array, which generates optic flow (Gibson, 1950;
Koenderink, 1986). Because optic flow contains dynamic patterns over time, perception
is dynamic and not based on perceiving a series of static snapshots of stimulus arrays.
Therefore, the goal of Experiment 3 was to manipulate the amount of information given
to participants through dynamically changing stimuli (an image that gradually shows
more object features). I predicted that affordance primes would allow participants to
respond to target objects at higher levels of blur faster than other primes (semantic and
non-associated).
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CHAPTER IV – Experiment 3
Experiment 2 showed a significant priming effect of affordance on reaction time
and accuracy. To get a more accurate measure of the amount of information needed by
participants to make the categorization decision I used a continuous measure of image
blur. In Experiment 3 objects were fully blurred and gradually revealed more features to
participants. Participants were asked to respond as soon as they recognized the objects.
This could, in principle, provide a better measure of the amount of information needed
for perceiving affordances, but it should not necessarily benefit object recognition. This
prediction is also consistent with Gibson’s conjecture that information that specifies
perception is dynamic, not static.
4.1 Participants
44 (36 females; Mage=20.69 years) from the University of Southern Mississippi
participated for partial course credit. Participants were required to have normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and have no motor problems.
4.2 Materials
Participants viewed the stimuli on a 30-inch color screen connected to a Windows
10 laptop. Responses (button presses) were done on a gaming keyboard. The stimuli were
presented and button presses (response time) were controlled by E-Prime 3.0 (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). A shoebox was visible to participants throughout the
experiment. Photographs used in Experiment 3 were altered in Photoshop. Image
transitions were created by reducing gaussian blur from 25 px to 0 px over a 10 second
period. Example of stimuli are shown in Figure 8.
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4.3 Design
Experiment 3 employed a within-subject design. Participants viewed primes
(words) and objects (pictures). The independent variable for Experiment 3 was Prime
Type (affordance, semantic feature, non-associates). Reaction times and accuracy were
used as dependent variables. To analyze the data a within-subjects repeated measures
ANOVA was conducted on reaction times using Prime type as the independent variable
with 3 levels (affordance, semantic, non-associate). A separate ANOVA was conducted
on accuracy. Percent blur was not analyzed due to its perfect correlation with reaction
time.
4.4 Procedure
Procedures were identical to those in Experiment 1 except for target stimuli (see
Figure 9). For Experiment 3, target objects were presented as a completely blurred image
that would ‘fade in’ to a clear image without any blur. The fade-in started at 100% blur
(completely black screen) and gradually became a completely clear (0% blur) picture in
10 seconds. The speed of the fading in from a completely blurry image to a completely
clear image was kept constant. Participants were asked to make their responses as soon as
they were able to make their decision.
4.5 Results
Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations for reaction times and accuracy.
The average reaction time was computed based on trials that resulted in correct
responses. There was a marginally significant effect of Prime type on reaction time F(2,
86)=2.96, p=.06, ŋp2=.06 (see Figure 10). This marginal effect was carried by the
apparent priming effect, i.e. the difference between semantic and non-associate prime
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trials (based on LSD-pairwise comparison, p=.03). The difference between affordance
primes and non-associate primes was approaching significance (LSD comparison, p=.06).
There was no main effect for Prime type on accuracy F(2, 88)=0.54, p=.58, ŋp2=.01 (see
Figure 11).
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CHAPTER V – Discussion Section
One of the goals of this research was to clarify the puzzling findings from Surber
et al. (2018) showing that affordance primes inhibited responding to target objects
(words). In that study the task was to judge abstractness versus concreteness of the target
object. I reasoned that neither the stimuli (words) nor the task were not favorable to
affordance perception due to being outside the domain of perceptual processing. It is
plausible to assume that affordances are optimally perceived through sensory experiences
(Experiment 1), and not via linguistic or abstract semantic processes. This means that
perceptual information should be necessary to facilitate responding to target objects
primed with affordances (Chainay & Humphreys, 2002). Specifically, affordance
perception may not be activated by the abstract nature of words. I tested this hypothesis
by using pictures as target stimuli.
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that participants were able to respond to target
objects quicker and more accurately when they were primed with an associated
affordance. This implies that affordances are processed differently than regular semantic
features. Specifically, affordances seem better suited for visual stimuli, while semantic
features are better suited for linguistic stimuli. This is supported by Glenberg’s (1997)
theory of embodied memory. Glenberg’s theory is founded on the idea that memory and
cognition guide perception and action. This means that the way that I process our
environments is based on the relationship between what our bodies are capable of and the
ways the environment constrains behavior. He further theorized that our memories are
not formed by association in the traditional manner, but rather through patterns of actions
connecting one idea to another. This could explain why affordance primes did not work
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with linguistic stimuli. Because language does not afford behavior in the same way that
tangible stimuli do (i.e. actual environment/objects) any associations between affordances
and linguistic information is weak. This also helps explain why a more perceptually
relevant stimulus such as a picture was needed to facilitate affordance priming.
Carter, Hough, Stuart, and Rastatter (2011) found that the longer the interstimulus interval between trials the weaker the priming effects. This could explain the
non-significant effects for Experiment 3. Specifically, because average reaction times
were around 8 seconds, priming effects were weakened by the time participants
responded to targets. To investigate this, confound a future study should be conducted
applying the experimental manipulation from Experiment 3 using a shorter fade-in
timeline. Participants would view targets that fade in from 100% blur to 0% blur in 5
seconds. Participants would be given a response deadline of 1.5 seconds, before the
object disappears. This is comparable to average response times obtained in Experiments
1 and 2. Participants would still be able to respond after the object disappears but would
only have a limited time to view the object. This should improve the strength of the
priming effect.
Another future goal would be to create a stimulus that is more ecologically valid
than linguistic information. Language may be too abstract to evoke the information
necessary for affordance perception processes. The current series of experiments have
shown that pictures of objects are sufficient to stimulate affordance perception; however,
pictures do not provide information that can only be accessed through a dynamic
perceptual stimulus such as real-world objects moving in space in the context of a
behaviorally meaningful task. Real-world objects are better remembered (Snow et al.,
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2014) and processed differently (Snow et al, 2011) than pictures. This means that there is
meaning lost when an object is photographed. An ultimate test of this observation is to
design a real-world replication of Experiment 1, in which targets are presented as either
pictures or the actual object involved in task-specific motion.
It is also not clear what the exact nature of information is, and how much
information is necessary to perceive affordances. The literature on biological motion
offers some suggestions on this problem. Movement patterns recorded of human activity
using point light displays are sufficient to specify what said activity is (Johansson, 1873).
For example, lights attached to joints of the body and recorded as a person performs an
action uniquely identify whether a person is walking, running, or doing some other
activity. The information is dynamic, complex, and can typically be perceived over time
as the pattern changes (Johansson, 1975). Static snapshots of such visual patterns are hard
to recognize, but as soon as they are set into motion, the correlated movement patterns
reveal the dynamic activity that is performed. For example, limb motion during
hammering creates a very different visual pattern than limb motion when one hits a tennis
ball with a racquet. I can recognize these patterns of action accurately and are able to
determine characteristics about the actor (i.e. gender) or the action from only the motion
in a point light display (Runeson & Frykholm, 1983). Future studies should utilize
stimuli created with point light displays. Adding or removing the number of visible points
tracking movement might provide the ultimate answer to the questions that were raised in
Experiment 3 about the richness of informational components necessary to support visual
perception of affordances.
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APPENDIX A – Tables
Table A.1 Descriptive Statistics Experiment 1

Table 1. Descriptive statistics for Reaction Time (in milliseconds) and Accuracy
(proportion of correct responses) in Experiment 1.
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Table A.2 Descriptive Statistics Experiment 2

Table 2. Descriptive statistics for Reaction Times and Accuracy in Experiment 2.
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Table A.3 Descriptive Statistics Experiment 3

Table 3. Descriptive statistics for Reaction Times and Accuracy in Experiment 3.
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APPENDIX B – Figures

Figure B.1 Timeline for Each Trial Sequence in Experiment 1
Participants were presented with either an affordance, semantic, or non-associated prime,
followed by the target object presented as either a word or picture.
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Figure B.2 Reaction Times Experiment 1
Mean reaction times for categorization decision by stimulus type. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.3 Accuracy Experiment 1
Mean accuracy for categorization decision by stimulus type. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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Figure B.4 Examples of Stimuli for Experiment 2
Objects were presented at the three different blur levels in Experiment 2. Participants saw
all objects at only one of the three types of blur.
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Figure B.5 Timeline for Each Trial Sequence in Experiment 2
Participants were presented with either an affordance-, semantic-, or non-associated
prime. This was followed by a picture of the target stimulus object at one of the three
image quality levels.
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Figure B.6 Reaction Times Experiment 2
Mean reaction times for categorization decision by image quality in Experiment 2. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.7 Accuracy Experiment 2
Mean accuracy for categorization decision by image quality in Experiment 2. Error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.8 Examples of Stimuli for Experiment 3
Objects as they transition from blurry (Gaussian blur of 25 pixel radius) to clear in
Experiment 3. Participants responded when they recognized the object.
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Figure B.9 Timeline for Each Trial Sequence in Experiment 3
Participants were presented with either an affordance, semantic, or non-associated prime.
Pictures of associated objects start out completely blurred and slowly become clear.

35

Figure B.10 Reaction Times Experiment 3
Mean reaction times for categorization decision for prime types in Experiment 3. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure B.11 Accuracy Experiment 3
Mean accuracy for categorization decision by for prime types. Error bars represent 95%
confidence intervals.
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